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Abstract
As this article is being drafted, the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic is causing harm and
disruption across the world. Many countries aimed at supporting their contact tracers with
the use of digital contact tracing apps in order to manage and control the spread of the
virus. Their idea is the automatic registration of meetings between smartphone owners for
the quicker processing of infection chains. To date, there are many contact tracing apps that
have already been launched and used in 2020. There has been a lot of speculations about
the privacy and security aspects of these apps and their potential violation of data protec-
tion principles. Therefore, the developers of these apps are constantly criticized because
of undermining users’ privacy, neglecting essential privacy and security requirements, and
developing apps under time pressure without considering privacy- and security-by-design.
In this study, we analyze the privacy and security performance of 28 contact tracing apps
available on Android platform from various perspectives, including their code’s privileges,
promises made in their privacy policies, and static and dynamic performances. Our method-
ology is based on the collection of various types of data concerning these 28 apps, namely
permission requests, privacy policy texts, run-time resource accesses, and existing security
vulnerabilities. Based on the analysis of these data, we quantify and assess the impact of
these apps on users’ privacy. We aimed at providing a quick and systematic inspection of
the earliest contact tracing apps that have been deployed on multiple continents. Our find-
ings have revealed that the developers of these apps need to take more cautionary steps to
ensure code quality and to address security and privacy vulnerabilities. They should more
consciously follow legal requirements with respect to apps’ permission declarations, privacy
principles, and privacy policy contents.
Keywords COVID-19 · Contact tracing app · Privacy · Security · Vulnerability ·
GDPR · Pandemic
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1 Introduction
As this paper is being written, the COVID-19 pandemic has spread across the world (Track-
corona 2020). To manage and control the pandemic, countries and regions are taking
different approaches. Enacting partial to full lockdown (with an exception of countries like
Sweden), mandating safe physical-distancing measures, face mask wearing for general pub-
lic, measures for closing/reopening schools and universities, encouraging remote working,
border control, using manual and digital contact tracing, and using hygiene measures are
among the widely adopted strategies to the pandemic (Han et al. 2020).
Many countries started the the introduction of contact tracing apps to manage and control
the spread of the virus (EDPB 2020a). Contact tracing apps should complement and support
the manual contact tracing as such a technology may not be able to penetrate in some pop-
ulations (e.g. children or elderly). Further, in some countries people may not have access to
smartphones and mobile devices to install such apps. Accordingly, manual contact tracing
remains the main method of contact tracing (EDPB 2020a; Ferretti et al. 2020).
To date, there are many contact tracing apps1 and many of them hastily designed,
developed, and produced (Covid-19 apps 2020).
These apps while essentially beneficial - in terms of generating a memory of proximity
identifiers and urgently alerting users if they come into contact with a COVID-19 positive
case (Ferretti et al. 2020) - present substantial security and privacy challenges. In this arti-
cle, we analyze the privacy and security aspects of COVID-19 contact tracing apps (a set
of 28 apps available on Android platform) by applying a multilateral analysis method for
Android apps introduced by Hatamian et al. (2019). Through this method, we analyze the
permissions declared in the Android manifest files. In particular, we focus on the danger-
ous permissions. We analyze the privacy policies of these apps. We monitor app behavior
by logging in each resource access event during run-time; here we fundamentally focus on
dangerous permissions even though the monitoring app documents other types of resource
access events. Lastly, to complement the privacy analysis we perform a security analysis
of each app’s program code in order to detect possible vulnerabilities. The period of our
analysis was May-June 2020, we collected data for accessible apps for this study, archived
their documentation, installed them on test phones in our labs, and started analyzing their
behavior.
Research questions. Researchers have pointed out the privacy and security challenges of
COVID-19 apps (Dar et al. 2020; Raskar et al. 2020). However, in this case, our motivation
is driven by several fundamental questions: What privacy sensitive data do the COVID-19
apps aim to extract from the users? Does the apps’ behavior match what has been indicated
in their privacy policies? Are there vulnerabilities that would undermine the information
security and privacy protection goals? To which extent the studied apps are compliant with
legal requirements (especially the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as this
study has been conducted in EU)? To address these questions, we develop a method that
combines four metrics: (i) apps’ data access potential from their permission requests, (ii)
dynamic app-behavior analysis by monitoring their run-time resource accesses patterns,
(iii) coverage of data protection principles by their corresponding privacy policy texts, and
(iv) static app-code analysis to document existing security vulnerabilities. The collected
1There is a plenty of COVID-19 related apps published for different purposes ranging from contact tracing
to symptom analysis. Throughout this paper, we mainly focus on those apps that are exclusively designed for
contact tracing purposes.
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data is used as a basis for a multi-perspective privacy and security analysis of COVID-
19 contact tracing apps, enabling an understanding of privacy and security related quality
indicators for rapidly deployed smartphone apps within the context of a health pandemic.
It should be noted that the privacy and security analysis scope of this paper is focused
on Android ecosystem and the reason is threefold: (1) the open-source nature of Android
and its flexibility in modifying the core components of the operating system to monitor
apps’ behavior along with the existence of a wide range of static and dynamic analysis
tools (2) compared to other mobile operating systems, Android is globally used by many
users, thanks to its domination of the market share (Mobile operating system market share
worldwide 2020; Statista 2020; IDC 2020). Furthermore, it is among the operating systems
with the most detected vulnerabilities (Android is the most vulnerable operating system
2019; DigitalInformationWorld 2019), making it an attractive platform for adversaries to
conduct malicious activities, and (3) during the data collection phase (see Section 3.1), we
noticed that all studied contact tracing apps are available on Android platform (28 out of 28
apps), while some of them were not available on iOS platform (6 out of 28 apps).
Structure of the paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
background information regarding the available COVID-19 contact tracing apps including
the technologies they rely on. It also provides some insights into compatability of these
apps with privacy regulation. While Section 3 elaborates on the steps that were taken into
consideration to design our study, Section 4 details our multi-perspective privacy and secu-
rity analysis. Further, based on the results obtained from the multi-perspective analysis,
Section 5 provides a holistic view through proposing and conducting an impact assessment
to compare the privacy and security performance of contact tracing apps. Section 6 dis-
cusses the main key insights, examines the compliance of COVID-19 contact tracing apps
with respect to fundamental privacy and security requirements, and provides several calls
for actions to revamp the identified issues. This paper is then concluded in Section 7.
2 COVID-19 contact tracing apps
Contact tracing is one of the methods used to contain a medical epidemic. By tracing
humans exposed to an infected person, the spread of infections can be reduced if those
potentially infected people can be isolated from the remaining population. In addition, con-
tact tracing helps in tracking the areas that are exposed to an infection (EDPB 2020a). In
what follows, we briefly discuss the existing technologies used in contact tracing apps along
with the compatibility of such apps with privacy regulation.
2.1 Existing technologies
During the emergence of the 2019-2020 pandemic disease COVID-19 caused by the SARS-
CoV-2 virus which spread at high speed, governments turned towards digital tracing of their
populations with the help of smartphone apps. The principal idea is that large parts of a
population carry phones with them, thus phones could be used as sensors for both record-
ing encounters between people as well as for registration of their whereabouts. Smartphone
location tracking is not a new concept (Fritsch 2008a). Mobile phones (including both smart
and non-smart ones) send and receive low power radio signals. The signals are sent to and
received from antennas that are attached to radio transmitters and receivers, usually referred
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to as base stations. The base stations are linked to the rest of the mobile and fixed phone cel-
lular networks and pass the signal/call on into those networks. Therefore, as part of services,
mobile phones are tracked as they move across different cellular networks (Al-Saffar et al.
2015). However, the sensing capabilities of phones have exceeded that of phone networks
both in precision and in the quality of information: GPS delivers more precise location data,
while scanning each other’s radio interfaces provides proximity information about close
encounters to other phones. The latter is used in Bluetooth contact tracing, where the short-
range wireless Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology is used to send and detect beacon
signals in order to register phone encounters. Moreover, it is an established practice in mar-
keting and customer intelligence gathering, and is widely used e.g. in digital media and radio
distribution in order to identify stations, products or billboards (Lashgari 2018; Rocamora
2017). Analyzing and processing of sensor-generated data (through sensors like accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, etc.) and ultrasonic signals through embedded sensors (microphone) sent
by other phones are other technique for digital contact tracing (eHealthNetwork 2020). In
the case of ultrasonic signals processing, one can expect more reliable accuracy than BLE
and GPS (Luo et al. 2018) as they both measure signals through walls and floors which
could produce false positives indoors. However, this is not the case for ultrasonic signals as
they will not travel through walls, floors, etc. Nevertheless, privacy concerns are not avoid-
able (ultra-privacy 2020) because of its reliance on the microphone (there is no guarantee
that only ultrasonic signals are collected).
In Table 1 the list of contact tracing apps analyzed and studied is available. This table
also details the technologies used in each app. As can be seen, each GPS and BLE has
accounted for 60% (17 apps) of all studied apps. This percentage is 10% (3 apps) for sensor-
based technologies (e.g. gyroscope, microphone, etc.). Our analysis shows that the reviewed
apps require a mixed variety of personal data to function, including precise location infor-
mation, data generated by sensors, phone number, gender, age, devices’ unique IDs, etc.
We argue that depending on the technologies used, there might be a trade-off between pri-
vacy and functionality. According to existing guidelines (EDPB-letter 2020), no usage of
GPS and use of decentralized storage is well-aligned with best design practices as apps will
not be able to track and monitor users’ precise movement patterns and store these data on
centralized storage. Additionally, the capability of devices to determine social distancing
varies depending on technologies used. For instance, when it comes to indoors positioning,
ultrasonic-based technologies are more reliable in terms of distance accuracy. On top of
that, potential interference and spatial blockage between different devices is another chal-
lenge that needs further research and development (Omar Al Kalaa et al. 2016; Tshiluna
et al. 2016).
2.2 Compatibility with privacy regulation
The fast spread of SARS-CoV-2 produced many proposals and implementations of contact
tracing apps. Some countries imposed tracking apps on their populations that implemented
a varying degree of government force on the bearers, ranging from self-reporting duties
through biometric surveillance up to publishing infected citizen’s movements on public
web pages. For instance, the Indian authorities announced that the use of Aarogya Setu
app is mandatory for federal government employees, food delivery workers, and some
other service providers. Moreover, to access public transport and airports one needs to
have it installed (IndiaMandatory 2020). In a similar scenario, Singapore contact tracing
app (TraceTogether) became mandatory for migrant workers (Singapore 2020). Not
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quite irrelevant to this, a university in the US has shown an interest in mandating students
to install a tracking app, otherwise they will face disciplinary proceedings and sanctions
(US-University 2020).
In the European Union (EU), compatibility with privacy regulation and proportionality
of measures were quickly pointed out by the European Commission when contact trac-
ing started being discussed (EDPB 2020b). For instance, on 8th April 2020 the European
Commission adopted a recommendation (COVID-europe 2020) towards a common Union
toolbox for the use of technology and data to combat and exit from the COVID-19 crisis,
in particular concerning mobile apps and the use of anonymized mobility data to develop a
common European approach for the use of apps at an EU level. Followed by this, the Euro-
pean Data Protection Board published a public letter (EDPB-letter 2020) where it was stated
that “contact tracing apps do not require location tracking of individual users. Their goal is
not to follow the movements of individuals or to enforce prescriptions. The main function
of such apps is to discover events (contacts with positive persons), which are only likely and
for the majority of users may not even happen, especially in the de-escalation phase. Col-
lecting an individual’s movements in the context of contact tracing apps would violate the
principle of data minimization. In addition, doing so would create major security and privacy
risks”. Inspired by the contributions made by the European Data Protection Board (2020)
and European eHealth Network (2020), on 16th April 2020 the European Commission pub-
lished COVID-europe 2020) the guidance on apps supporting the fight against COVID-19
pandemic in relation to data protection to ensure a coherent approach across the EU and
provided guidance to Member States and app developers regarding the features and require-
ments that contact tracing apps should meet to ensure compliance with the EU privacy and
personal data protection legislation, in particular the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) 2016) and the ePrivacy Directive (2002). In a very similar effort, on 4th May 2020
the UK Information Commissioner’s Office published (2020) data protection expectations
on contact tracing app development outlining nine data protection principles (transparency,
data minimization, user control, data security, etc.) which are linked to the core principles
and provisions of data protection law and are designed to support design and development
decisions of app developers.
The call for compliance with data protection acts and ethics is not only limited to the
EU as it is globally demanded. On 28th May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
published an interim guideline covering the main ethical principles and requirements to
achieve equitable and appropriate use of digital contact tracing technology. Again, most
of these principles (transparency, data minimization, data retention, data security, etc.) are
well-aligned with other globally endorsed data protection principles (WHO 2020). In this
paper, we aim at inspecting the COVID-19 contact tracing apps from an information secu-
rity and privacy perspective, to investigate if the developers and producers of these apps are
mindful of the aforementioned legal requirements and if they have made their apps opera-
tional under privacy and security considerations aiming at respecting individuals’ privacy.
For this reason, we examine available COVID-19 contact tracing apps for cues about their
privacy and security quality through several lenses as detailed in the next sections.
3 Study design
Our multi-perspective analysis comprises multiple static and dynamic analysis techniques
enabling a comprehensive understanding of privacy and security performance of existing
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COVID-19 contact tracing apps. A high-level overview of our study is shown in Fig. 1.
Our study consists of three main building blocks, namely Study Design (Section 3), Multi-
Perspective Analysis (Section 4), and Impact Assessment (Section 5). The Study Design
building block details the methods and design steps that were used as multiple inputs for the
Multi-Perspective Analysis. As it is depicted in Fig. 1, the first lot of Study Design is data
collection (Section 3.1). The second lot (code’s privileges analysis, Section 3.2) enabled an
inspection of permission manifest (see Section 4.1). The third lot (privacy policy coverage
analysis, Section 3.3) was subjected to inspection about policy coverage (see Section 4.2).
Furthermore, the fourth lot (dynamic and static analysis, Section 3.4) was used to perform
dynamic and static performance analyses (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively). It should
be noted that the dynamic analysis phase yielded a secondary data set consisting of apps’
run-time permission access logs, which was populated through a one week data collec-
tion campaign in Germany and Sweden (elaborated in Section 4.3). We archived all the
data sets in a Git Repository2. The Multi-Perspective Analysis building block serves
as an input for the Impact Assessment aiming at synthesising the results obtained from
our multi-perspective analysis. Since strong security and strong privacy are preconditions
for designing IT products (including smartphone apps) (Cavoukian 2010), the methodol-
ogy used in this paper relies on both privacy and security performance analysis of apps
that avoids the pretense of false dichotomies such as privacy versus security. Hence, our
work remains within the intersection of security and privacy aiming at investigating privacy
and security quality indicators inspired by legal requirements such as data minimization,
transparency, purpose limitation, and confidentiality. In addition, since our methodology
comprises both static and dynamic analyses, it retains the main benefits of both techniques
(Chaulagain et al. 2020; Choudhary and Kishore 2018). In what follows, we explain the
steps that were taken to collect our data. Afterwards, we elaborate on the main pillars of the
study design – as shown in Fig. 1.
3.1 Data collection
Our study is focused on Android contact tracing apps, however, Google Play Store does
not provide any specific category for these apps. We identify them by searching for the
strings like “covid contact tracing”, “covid”, and “contact tracing” on Google Play Store’s
search engine. However, such a search technique has two main limitations: (1) depending
on the location where the queries are done (Germany and Sweden where the researchers
of this paper were located), Google may eliminate some of the search results; and (2) such
search strings sometimes return irrelevant results, e.g. COVID-19 symptom checker apps
(that are not in the scope of this paper). Therefore, both these processes can produce false
negatives and false positives, respectively. To overcome these limitations, for (1) we also
repeated the same procedure on unofficial app stores (APKMirror 2020; APKPure 2020)
that are location-independent that contain the APK files of apps regardless of where the
search queries are done. For (2), we manually eliminate any app that does not introduce
contact tracing (tracking and monitoring the spread of the virus) as one of its core function-
alities. Furthermore, during our data collection process, we noticed that some of the contact
tracing apps are not yet available in any app market other than their own websites (e.g. by
regularly checking the list of produced COVID-related apps all over the globe (Covid-19
2https://git.cs.kau.se/nurumome/AnalysisOfContactTracingAppsAppendixMaterial














































Fig. 1 A high-level overview of multi-perspective privacy and security analysis of COVID-19 contact tracing
apps
apps 2020)). As such, we were able to find and collect the APK files for those apps as well.
In total, we found 28 contact tracing apps as shown in Table. 1.
3.2 Code’s privileges
Mobile operating systems follow certain mechanisms to control and limit the amount of
personal information accessed by apps (Hamed and Ben Ayed 2016). As a particular exam-
ple, in Android, apps can request to access the device’s resources through permissions.
Depending on the resource types, consent from users is required (Hatamian et al. 2017).
Every Android app has an AndroidManifest.xml file that contains information
about that particular app (e.g., its name, author, icon, and description) and permissions that
grant access to data such as call logs, contact lists or location tracks on smartphones (Momen
et al. 2019). Approval from the user for granting a dangerous permission is required during
the first use of the app. In such a permission managing scheme, it is difficult to perceive
consequence for granting access and assess the risk, if not impossible (Zhauniarovich and
Gadyatskaya 2016). Moreover, information is hardly available about the usage of permis-
sions that are allowed access to resources (Hatamian et al. 2017). Hence, an app should only
request and access those permissions that are relevant to its functionality. As such, this pil-
lar of our analysis (see Section 4.1) collects and analyzes the code’s privileges, i.e. access
intentions from the Android apps’ manifest to investigate the mapping, diversity, and crit-
ical aspects of COVID-19 contact tracing apps’ permission requests with respect to users’
privacy.
3.3 Privacy policy coverage
The privacy policy of an app is a statement, or a legal document that gives information
about the ways an app provider collects, uses, discloses, and manages users’ data. By law,
service providers (including app providers) are required to be transparent about their data
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Table 1 Collected data set: apps, country of origin, technology, functionality
# Country App Technology How it functions
GPS BLE Sensors
1 Australia COVIDSafe X Based on BLE, it records anyone a
user gets close to who also has the app.
The two apps exchange IDs. If some-
one is tested positive, they then get a
unique code from a health official via
SMS to use in the app to consent to
upload the list of anonymised IDs for
the past 21 days of contact for con-
tact tracing. It uses signal strength and
other data then to work out who needs
to be contacted.
2 Austria Stopp Corona X Determines and compares the sent/
received signal strengths between
users. If similar, it draws the conclu-
sion that the two phones are in close
proximity. The app processes times-
tamps, app-ID, user-ID, OS version,
device model, and Wifi access point
MAC addresses.
3 Brazil Coronavirus-SUS X Logs users’ location data and daily
reporting of symptoms together with
other personal data (age, name, medi-
cal history, etc.) and traces the spread
of the virus.
4 Columbia CoronApp X Logs users’ location data and daily
reporting of symptoms together with
other personal data (age, name, medi-
cal history, etc.) and traces the spread
of the virus.
5 Czech Republic eRouska X Uses BLE to log phones that the user
has had close contacts with. Once
someone is tested positive, it notifies
other users to test and isolate.
6 Germany Ito X Uses BLE to log phones that the user
has had close contacts with. Upon a
positive test, contacted users receive
a code from the health department to
enter in the app. The code is then be
uploaded together with the verifica-
tion of the positive test.
7 Hungary VirusRadar X Uses BLE to communicate with other
users and exchanges encrypted data
about the distance of surrounding
devices if they have been at a danger-
ous distance. If users become infected,
they can share their data. The data for-
warded to the authorities can be used
to trace contacts patients had inter-
acted with within a 2 meter distance
for at least 20 minutes in the last 14
days.
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Table 1 (continued)
# Country App Technology How it functions
GPS BLE Sensors
8 Georgia Stop Covid X X X Based on collecting location and prox-
imity data, sensor data (gyroscope,
acceleration, magnetometer), activity
data provided by the operating sys-
tem, and user-ID, it logs interactions
that span more than 15 minutes and
take place within two meters. If a user
tests positive, he can inform the app,
and can provide information pertain-
ing to contacts in the last five days. All
other users which have been in contact
with him in the last five days will be
notified by the app.
9 Iceland Ranking C-19 X Tracks users’ GPS data to compile a
record of where they have been to look
at whether those with a positive diagno-
sis are potentially spreading the disease.
10 India Mahakavach X Collects location history, name, email,
phone number, age, gender, and medical
records and history to trace the geo-
graphical spots a user has been to in the
last 14-20 days, and checks how many
other people may have come in con-
tact with and thus, possibly transmitted
the virus to. It collects these data for
other purposes than contact tracing (e.g.
to generate reports, heat maps and other
statistical visualizations).
11 India COVA Punjab X Collects personal data such as demo-
graphics, IMEI/IMSI number, device
ID, and movement patterns to trace the
geographical spots a user has been to,
and checks how many other people may
have come in contact with and thus, pos-
sibly transmitted the virus to. If the user
delets the app, he will still continue to be
a registered user of the app and receive
promotions /newsletters/ notifications.
12 India Aarogya Setu X X Works based on access to proximity (via
BLE) and GPS information to alert peo-
ple when they come in contact with
someone who has tested positive.
13 Israel Hamagen X Works based on GPS information and
correlates location history to alert
people when they come in contact
with someone who has tested positive,
including the exact time and location.
14 Italy SM-Covid19 X X Uses BLE and GPS to monitor the num-
ber of contacts, duration of time with
contacts, and distance between contacts.
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Table 1 (continued)
# Country App Technology How it functions
GPS BLE Sensors
15 Italy diAry X X X Collects GPS, Wi-Fi, bluetooth, gyro-
scopes, oscillators, accelerometers and
magnetometers data. Detects the posi-
tion and the movements of the user.
It calculates daily statistics of the time
passed in each place or of each move-
ment, recognizing if the movements are
done by foot, bicycle or motorized vehi-
cles. These data can be uploaded to a
central database.
16 Jordan Aman X Collects user location data to examine
and compare movements of users in par-
allel to those of virus carriers already
identified. Should a locational overlap
occur between users and virus carriers
later identified as patients, it alerts its
users about a possible exposure to the
virus and provides instructions about
home isolation and contacting author-
ities. Once a user tested positive, it
retraces the user’s movements and pro-
vides information such as dates, times,
and places to notify other users who
happened to be in the vicinity of the
diagnosed patient.
17 Malaysia Gerak X Requires personal details, name,
address and email. Users also have to
give permission to track their location
at all times via the phone’s GPS.
18 Malaysia MyTrace X Collects proximity data whenever the
app detects another device with the
same app installed. When a user is
tested positive, it uploads the data from
the user’s smartphone to a centralized
database.
19 North Macedonia StopKorona! X Uses BLE to exchange anonymized data
with every other nearby users, mea-
suring their mutual distance. It uses
received signal strength indication val-
ues to measure signal strengths between
telephones. These calibrated values are
used to estimate approximate distance
between users, whereas the duration of
such connection is registered by the
mobile app itself.
20 Norway Smittestopp X X Collects proximity (via BLE) and loca-
tion data to detect other nearby phones
with the app installed. Anyone defined
as a close contact in the days prior to the
diagnosis will receive an SMS.
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Table 1 (continued)
# Country App Technology How it functions
GPS BLE Sensors
21 Russia Contact Tracer X X Accesses location data through GPS,
Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi signals to check
users had been in close contact with
individuals infected by the virus. It will
identify those who contacted the person
within 14 days.
22 Singapore Trace Together X Collects phone number and user-ID
and and exchanges Bluetooth signals
between phones to detect other partici-
pating users in close proximity to notify
users in case a positive case is detected.
23 South Africa Covi-ID X Collects location, name, date of birth,
gender, email, physical address, and
phone numbers. Users are asked to enter
their COVID-19 status. They are then
assigned a QR code on their smart-
phones. When a user goes somewhere
(e.g. to work), the QR code is scanned
and he gets a so-called geolocation
receipt that details where and when the
user has been at a certain time.
24 UK COVID Symptom
Study
X Collects body temperature, height and
weight, gender, age, location, name,
email phone number, IP address, and
device ID and to measure how quickly
the virus is spreading in different areas
and identify areas and users at high risk.
25 US COVID Safe X Collects proximity data and user-IDs.
Users get notified if someone who was
near them within the last two weeks
has come down with symptoms of
COVID-19.
26 US PrivateKit X Collects location data and user-IDs,
keeping a time-stamped log every five
minutes to notify users in case a positive
case is detected.
27 US NOVID X X Based on BLE and ultrasonic signals, it
logs users proximity information when
he spends some time physically close to
someone else who has the the app. If a
user tells the app if he has tested posi-
tive, people that have come into contact
with that user recently will receive a
notification.
28 Global Coalition X Proximity data including the amount of
exposure period and the length of time
and user-IDs are collected. If a user is
tested positive, all phones that have been
in his proximity are informed.
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collection, sharing, and processing practices and specify how they comply with legal princi-
ples (Hatamian 2020). Moreover, privacy policies are the main sources that enable users to
understand how their data is being handled by app developers/providers (Reidenberg et al.
2015). Hence, this pillar of our analysis (see Section 4.2) provides insights into the extent
to which the privacy policy texts of COVID-19 contact tracing apps cover fundamental pri-
vacy policy principles. Our study focuses on the fulfillment of fundamental legal principles
proposed in Hatamian (2020), the extent to which the privacy policy texts of COVID-19
contact tracing apps are correlated with what developers request (in manifest) and what they
do in reality (actual permission usage), and ultimately the discrepancies/similarities in apps’
privacy policies published by the EU and non-EU bodies in terms of covering fundamental
privacy principles. Based on keyword- and semantic-based search techniques, for each pri-
vacy policy a group of three data protection experts with legal and technical background of
data privacy and security went through the texts. The goal was to figure out if they can find
any overlap between each and every section of privacy policy texts and the legal principles
discussed in the following. As our research is conducted in EU countries, our analysis is
solely based on the GDPR. In the following, we briefly discuss each of the privacy policy
principles.
Data Collection The legal foundation is set in Art. 5 (1) and Art. 6 GDPR. While the
former article states the general principles of processing personal data, the latter indicates
when processing is lawful, including when consent is given, when it is necessary for the
performance of a contract or compliance with a legal obligation, to protect vital interests
of user or another natural person, and when processing is necessary for a task carried out
in the public interest or for legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third-
party. However, this applies if and only if such interests do not override the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of users. Monetizing purposes, i.e., advertising, are not
classified as necessary and therefore need to be based on another legal ground. Similarly,
the processing of data to develop new features and services is not specific enough to comply
with this section (ENISA 2017).
Children Protection Information related to children must be treated with the utmost cau-
tion, as children “may be less aware of the risks, consequences, and safeguards concerned
and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data” (Rec. 38 GDPR). This implies
that services targeted at children are obliged to provide information in clear and plain lan-
guage that children can understand easily (Rec. 58 GDPR). Art. 8 GDPR defines that the
processing of children’s data is only lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. The
data processing of younger children is only legitimate if and to the extent, a parent or legal
guardian has given consent. However, this article has an opening clause, allowing member
states to set a lower age for those purposes, yet not below 13 years.
Third-Party Sharing Third-party components (that might collect data as well) are often
integrated into an app’s development phase. The legal basis lies in Art. 13 (1e) GDPR,
stating that the recipients or categories of recipients of personal data must be revealed to
users.
Third-Country Sharing The GDPR dedicates its Chapter 5 to provisions on transfers of
personal data to third-countries or international organizations. The transfer of data to other
countries is only lawful, where a similar level of protection as provided by the GDPR is
guaranteed. In fact, the protection of data travels with the data itself. Thus, if app providers
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share personal data with servers located outside the EU, they shall mention it in their privacy
policy text how they deal with third-country data sharing practices.
Data Protection The GDPR in Art. 32 states that the data controller must implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure appropriate security. This is
of particular importance in smartphone ecosystems since they are typically linked to a
huge amount of data transfer. The aspect of data protection is also closely correlated with
privacy-by-design (Cavoukian 2010).
Data Retention The retention of data is a delicate issue, as app providers may want to retain
data as long as possible to enable future transactions and purposes. However, this is often
not in the interest of users, particularly not for sensitive data as available in smartphones
(e.g., personal information from dating apps or health data from contact tracing apps). To
protect users, the principle of data minimization and storage limitation in combination with
transparency take effect. Accordingly, Art. 13 (2), 14 (2) of the GDPR state that the data
controller must inform users for what period their data is retained. This is strictly required
as users have “the right to be forgotten”, which is set in Art. 17 of the GDPR.
User’s Control The whole Chapter 3 of the GDPR is dedicated to the rights of users. The
most important rights are the right to information and access to personal data; the right
to rectification; the right to erasure (see the previous principle); the right to restriction of
processing; the right to data portability; and the right to object and automated individual
decision-making. By Art. 13 (2), 14 (2) of the GDPR, app providers are required to provide
these rights to users to ensure fair and transparent data processing (principle of lawfulness,
fairness and transparency Art. 5 (1a)).
Privacy Policy Changes To further ensure lawful, fair, and transparent processing of data,
app providers should inform users in a transparent and understandable way about privacy
policy changes. This obligation is derived from Art. 12 of the GDPR.
Privacy Breach Notification Besides Art. 12 GDPR, which lays the basis of informing
users, this principle is based on Art. 34 GDPR where it is stated that if a data breach occurs
that results in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of users, the data controller must inform
users without undue delay. In this notification, the data protection officer must be named and
likely consequences of the data breach as well as the measures taken to mitigate the effects
are described. The same is applicable for the notification of the supervisory authority, which
must be done not later than 72 hours after the detection of a personal data breach.
App-Focused This principle is subsumed under the principle of lawfulness, fairness, and
transparency. Sometimes a privacy policy is not exclusively written for a specific app, but
multiple services provided by the same app developer (data controller). For instance, Sun-
yaev et al. (2015) identified five reoccurring scopes of privacy policies, namely privacy
policies for a single app, for multiple apps, for a back-end app, for a developer homepage
or for all developer services. They also found that several privacy policies of apps did not
have an app-related scope at all.
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Purpose Specification This principle is closely related to the data collection principle.
While the focus of data collection is on what data is collected, this principle refers to the
clear statement of data collection purposes. Besides the legal basis for data processing, app
providers are required to specify data collection purposes according to Art. 13 (1c), 14 (1c)
GDPR. This is not only important under the aspect of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency,
but also the principle of purpose limitation to prevent exploitation of personal data for other
use cases.
Contact Information Contact information is linked to the principle of lawfulness, fairness,
and transparency. According to Art. 13 (1a), 14 (1a) GDPR, users have the right to be
informed about the actual identity of data collectors, i.e., app providers. This includes the
name of the app provider, if it is a legal entity, its legal representatives as well as its postal
address. The latter must be provided to give users the possibility to file a formal complaint.
3.4 Dynamic and static analysis
Mobile app users trade their data for service usage in opaque ways. Accessibility to user
data through permissions gives carte-blanche3 access for an app without any constraints.
Though the user has the option to revoke granted permissions, the absence of monitor-
ing tools and unexpected consequences such as service exclusion (being unable to use a
certain service) or malfunctions (e.g. UI malfunctioning) may cause hindrances in limit-
ing access to permissions (Almuhimedi et al. 2015; Franzen and Aspinall 2016; Van Kleek
et al. 2017). As such, it is not only important to assess the real data access patterns of
apps, e.g. what personal data an app is accessing while the user is not using it, but also
how the app performs in terms of limiting/minimizing potential vulnerabilities within its
code. Therefore, this pillar of our analysis analyzes the contact tracing apps from two
dimensions:
1. We dynamically measure apps’ real permission access patterns (see Section 4.3)
based on our previously implemented tools described in Hatamian et al. (2018) and
Momen (2018). Our approach is based on AppOps which is a privacy manager tool
and introduced in Android 4.3.4 In order to collect logs, a timer is sent to the
PermissionUsageLogger service periodically. When it is received, the logger
queries the AppOps service that is already running on the phone for a list of apps that
have used any of the operations we are interested in tracking. We then check through
that list and for any app that has used an operation more recently than we have already
checked, we store the time at which that operation was used in our own internal log.
These timestamps can then be counted to get a usage count. We argue that such an anal-
ysis can reveal apps’ behavior and its impact on individual privacy, because of the fact
that data collection can be identified as the first step that could lead to potential privacy
violation (Daniel 2006).
2. We statically analyze the contact tracing apps (see Section 4.4) and look for poten-
tial vulnerabilities in their program codes using Mobile Security Framework (MobSF)
(Mobile security framework (mobsf) 2020). MobSF is a security analysis tool that is
3Full discretionary power (Merriam-Webster dictionary), Accessed 12.06.2020.
4https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/AppOpsManager Accessed 25.09.2020
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capable of performing both static and dynamic analysis, penetration testing and mal-
ware analysis of Android, iOS and Windows apps. Thus, this pillar of our analysis
examines the existing security vulnerabilities of COVID-19 contact tracing apps.
4 Multi-perspective privacy and security analysis
In this section, we expand each pillar of our analysis method. Section 4.1 details the per-
mission manifest analysis. Section 4.2 elaborates on the privacy policy coverage through
inspecting apps’ privacy policy documents with respect to legally binding privacy princi-
ples. While Section 4.3 details the examinations regarding the real data access patterns of
apps in a dynamic way, Section 4.4 digs into the steps that we took to uncover the potential
vulnerabilities found in apps’ codes.
4.1 Permissionmanifest analysis
In Android, apps can request access to the device’s resources through permissions. Depend-
ing on the resource types, consent from users is required. Android defines three types of
permissions:5 normal, dangerous, and signature. Normal level permissions allow access to
resources that are considered low-risk, and they are granted during the installation of any
package requesting them. The dangerous level permissions grant access to resources that
are considered to be high-risk. In this case, the user is explicitly asked to grant permissions.
So-called signature level permissions are granted at install time, but only when the app
that attempts to use a permission is signed by the same certificate as the app that defines
the permission. Every app has an AndroidManifest.xml file that contains informa-
tion about that particular app (e.g., its name, author, icon, and description) and permissions
that grant access to data such as call logs, contact lists or location tracks on smartphones.
We collect and analyze app developers’ data access intentions from the Android apps’
manifest to investigate permission request patterns, suspicious permission requests, and
discrepancies/similarities in apps’ permission requests published by EU and non-EU bodies.
4.1.1 Detected permission requests
Table 2 lists the detected permission requests by the apps within our data set together with
their descriptions. In total, 31 permission requests were detected. Among these 31 permis-
sions, 16 permissions (51.6%) belong to normal, 11 (35.4%) to dangerous, and 4 (12.9%)
to signature categories, respectively.
4.1.2 Permission requests per app
Figure 2 shows the details of permission requests per app. Overall, there are 335 permission
request incidents. Almost one-third (31%) of these incidents pertain to the category danger-
ous having a direct impact on users’ privacy, 66% normal permissions, and 3% signature
permissions. Among the apps within our data set, Gerak and Mahakavach declare 8 (out
of 18) and 7 (out of 14) of their permission requests from dangerous permission category,
respectively. Followed by this, each of diAry, Covid Safe, and COVID Punjab apps
5https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview Accessed 28.05.20
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Table 2 List of detected permissions within the data set and their descriptions
Type Permission Description
Normal INTERNET Allows to open network sockets.
Normal BLUETOOTH Allows to connect to paired blue-
tooth devices.
Normal BLUETOOTH ADMIN Allows to discover and pair blue-
tooth devices.
Normal FOREGROUND SERVICE Allows the use of foreground ser-
vices.
Normal REQUEST IGNORE BATTERY OPITIMIZATION Controls an app’s execution at the
potential expense of the user’s bat-
tery life.
Normal ACCESS NETWORK STATE Allows to access information about
networks.
Normal WAKE LOCK Allows to keep processor from
sleeping or screen from dimming.
Normal RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED Allows the app to have itself started
as soon as the system has finished
booting.
Normal VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
Normal ACCESS WIFI STATE Allows access to information about
Wi-Fi networks.
Normal CHANGE WIFI STATE Allows to change Wi-Fi connectiv-
ity state.
Normal READ SYNC SETTINGS Allows to read the sync settings.
Normal WRITE SYNC SETTINGS Allows to write the sync settings.
Normal BIND GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE Allows to recognize where the app
was installed from.
Normal CHANGE NETWORK STATE Allows to change network connec-
tivity state.
Normal MODIFY AUDIO SETTINGS Allows to modify global audio set-
tings.
Dangerous ACCESS FINE LOCATION Allows to access precise location.
Dangerous ACCESS COARSE LOCATION Allows to access approximate loca-
tion.
Dangerous ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION Allows to access location in the
background.
Dangerous CALL PHONE Allows to initiate a phone call with-
out user’s confirmation.
Dangerous CAMERA Allows access to the camera.
Dangerous ACTIVITY RECOGNITION Allows the recognition of physical
activities, e.g. user’s step count.
Dangerous READ EXTERNAL STORAGE Allows to read from external stor-
age.
Dangerous WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE Allows to write to external storage.
Dangerous READ PHONE STATE Allows read access to phone state,
e.g. phone number and current cel-
lular network information.
Dangerous RECORD AUDIO Allows to record audio.
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Table 2 (continued)
Type Permission Description
Dangerous READ CONTACTS Allows to read the user’s contacts data.
Signature GET TASKS Allows to discover information
about which apps are used on the
device.
Signature SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW Allows to create windows shown on
top of all other apps.
Signature PACKAGE USAGE STATS Allows to collect component usage
statistics.
Signature REQUEST INSTALL PACKAGES Allows to request installing pack-
ages.
requests 6 permissions from dangerous category. By contrast, we also found apps in our
data set that either do not ask for any dangerous permission (1 app, Stopp Corona) or
only ask for one dangerous permission (COVIDSafe). Figure 2 clearly indicates that, in
general, COVID-19 contact tracing apps require a mixed variety of permissions to provide
their desired services. In terms of median value, COVID-19 contact tracing apps request 12
permissions, 4 of them being labeled as dangerous.
Fig. 2 Details of permission requests per app: normal permissions (blue), dangerous permissions (orange),
and signature permissions (gray)
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4.1.3 Permission type analysis
Figure 3 shows the commonly found permissions within our data set based on their
permission type. The analysis shows that dangerous permission requests accounted
for 30% of the top 10 requested permissions, namely ACCESS FINE LOCATION (26
apps), ACCESS COARSE LOCATION (21 apps), and ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION
(16 apps). Furthermore, when it comes to dangerous permission requests, the con-
tact tracing apps indicate a hungriness level of requesting the following permis-
sions: ACCESS FINE LOCATION (26 apps), ACCESS COARSE LOCATION (21 apps),
ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION (16 apps), WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (10 apps),
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE (9 apps), ACTIVITY RECOGNITION (8 apps), CAMERA (7
apps), CALL PHONE (3 apps), READ PHONE STATE (2 apps), RECORD AUDIO (1 app),
and READ CONTACTS (1 app).
Although our main focus is on dangerous permission requests, non-dangerous permis-
sion requests can also pose serious risks on users’ privacy. It is important to highlight
that non-dangerous permissions can be easily misused to profile users. As a particular
example, GET TASKS permissions which is requested by 5 apps can reveal sensitive infor-
mation about which apps are being used by the user. As a result, the provider of the
contact tracing apps is able to see ActivityManager.RecentTaskInfo6 that can
retrieve information about tasks that the user has most recently started or visited. Simi-
larly, SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW is another example of non-dangerous permissions that can
reveal highly sensitive information through creating overlays that can trick users by covering
certain areas of the screen while making the overlaid area responsive (Alepis and Patsakis
2017, 2019).
It is also important to highlight that the combination of such permission requests
may reveal interesting information about users (Fritsch and Momen 2017; Momen
and Fritsch 2020). For example, ACCESS WIFI STATE (requested by 8 apps),
CHANGE NETWORK STATE (requested by 3 apps), and CHANGE WIFI STATE (requested
by 4 apps) – these permissions are automatically granted to the apps as they are labeled as
normal. The combination of accessing them allows an app to connect and disconnect from
a given WiFi network. Such a combination of permission requests allows an app to retrieve
information of the connected WiFi networks which can reveal highly sensitive information
such as how long certain users stayed in a similar proximity, how often, when exactly, etc.
Achara et al. (2014) and Alepis and Patsakis (2019).
4.1.4 The GDPR impact
As it can be observed from our data set discussed in Section 3.1, the studied contact tracing
apps have been developed and published across different countries. Therefore, this aspect of
our analysis deals with the question of how contact tracing apps may behave differently or
similarly in terms of dangerous permission requests when it comes their geographic area in
which they got produced and published. Since our research is conducted in Europe and the
legal requirements enforced by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (2016)
and relevant European authorities serve as a benchmark for our multi-perspective privacy
and security analysis, we generally categorize all the apps within our data set into two main
categories, namely EU (9 apps) that mainly covers those Member States where the GDPR is
6https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.RecentTaskInfo Accessed 12.06.20
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Fig. 3 Permissions found from the manifest analysis: the most sought after dangerous permission is
ACCESS FINE LOCATION (found in 26 apps out of 28), and READ CONTACTS and RECORD AUDIO are
requested by only one app
enforced and non-EU apps (19 apps). Such a comparison enables us to not only compare the
behavior of certain apps within a category, but also the discrepancies or similarities between
each individual category in terms of requesting dangerous permissions. Figure 4 shows the
comparative analysis in terms of dangerous permission requests per category (percentage
is calculated by dividing the number of apps in a certain group, e.g. non-EU apps, which
request a certain dangerous permission by the total number of apps in that group). Overall,
Fig. 4 Comparison of dangerous permissions found in the manifest analysis: EU vs. non-EU contact tracing
apps (the lower, the better)
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the results clearly indicate that the developers/providers of apps published within the EU
category request less sensitive permissions than others. One potential interpretation for such
a behavior might be the strong enforcement of the EU GDPR along with other strict Euro-
pean guidelines concerning designing and developing contact tracing apps (COVID-europe
2020, 2020, 2020). Except for phone-related information (e.g. IMEI and phone number), the
EU apps request less sensitive permissions than non-EU apps in all respects. For instance,
when it comes to location-related permission requests, non-EU apps request slightly more
than double in comparison to the EU ones. The reason for such behavior may be threefold.
Firstly, the GDPR has a clear and strict vision on data minimization and purpose specifica-
tion as it states in its Art. 5 (1b) that personal data shall be “collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with
those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Art. 89 (1), not
be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes”. Further, it states (in Art. 6 (4))
that “data processing for incompatible purposes should be avoided unless it is on the basis
of a specific set of criteria in the GDPR”. Secondly, in the EU, collecting location data for-
ever and obtaining single user consent (for multiple purposes) was unacceptable under the
previous Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) (1995). Nevertheless, thanks to the
GDPR, it is now even more stricter as the GDPR provides more detailed information on data
usage and retention and consent becomes even more specific. Thirdly, ePrivacy Directive
(2002) more in details elaborate on the issue of location data collection and clearly states
that such a data collection may result in high privacy risks, particularly when individuals’
movement patterns are tracked. Further, it states that “such data may only be processed when
they are made anonymous, or with the consent of the users or subscribers to the extent and
for the duration necessary for the provision of a value added service. The service provider
must inform the users or subscribers, prior to obtaining their consent, of the type of location
data other than traffic data which will be processed, of the purposes and duration of the pro-
cessing and whether the data will be transmitted to a third party for the purpose of providing
the value added service. Users or subscribers shall be given the possibility to withdraw their
consent for the processing of location data other than traffic data at any time”. Nevertheless,
we should highlight that although the EU apps have better performance (compared to non-
EU apps) in asking location-related permissions, their behavior is still not compliant with
the requirements and recommendations published by the European Commission and other
EU data protection authorities as many of them are asking to access such data.
4.2 Privacy policy analysis
In our analysis, we pay attention to privacy policy analysis of contact tracing apps and
fulfillment of 12 fundamental legal principles proposed in Hatamian (2020), the extent to
which the privacy policy texts of COVID-19 contact tracing apps match what developers
request (in manifest) and what they do in reality (actual permission usage), and ultimately
the discrepancies/similarities in apps’ privacy policies published by EU and non-EU bodies
in terms of covering fundamental privacy principles. However, one should bear in mind that
since these principles are extracted from the GDPR, they may not be necessarily applicable
to all non-EU apps, especially those that do not offer a strong data protection regulation as
offered by the GDPR.
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4.2.1 Privacy policy completeness analysis
Figure 5 shows the results of privacy policy analysis of the apps within our data set. The
result indicates to which extent an app has been successful to fulfill the privacy policy prin-
ciples. The results show that the Gerak app fulfills the maximum number of principles (9
principles), followed by Stopp Corona (8 principles) and VirusRadar (8 principles).
Surprisingly, our findings also revealed that some of these apps (five apps) do not fulfill any
privacy policy principle either because they do not have any privacy policy text accessible
on the Internet that is the case for two of them (e.g. Coronavirus-SUS and Aarogya
Setu) or because they have very generic text that does not discuss the data collection and
sharing practices of apps, rather irrelevant information that is the case for three of them
(MyTrace, Covid Safe, and PrivateKit).
Figure 6 provides a detailed overview regarding the total number of privacy policy prin-
ciples covered by each contact tracing app. As it can be seen, the maximum number of
principles covered is 9 (out of 12). Moreover, only 10 (35.7%) apps covered more than half
of the principles, and the rest either did not cover any principles (17.8%, 5 apps) or covered
less than half of the principles (46.5%, 13 apps).
4.2.2 Coverage of privacy policy principles
Figure 7 shows the coverage of privacy policy principles by the apps within our data set.
Our inspection shows that data collection is the most covered principle (17 apps). Surpris-
ingly, we found out that no apps fulfilled the privacy breach notice principle. This is highly
critical as service providers in EU are enforced by law to adopt appropriate remedies in
case of a data breach. This also shows that none of these apps are well-prepared in case
users’ personal data fall into the wrong hands due to a privacy breach. The same also holds
for children protection and privacy policy changes where only a few apps (1 app for chil-
dren protection and 3 apps for privacy policy changes) clarified how their data collection,
sharing, and processing practices fulfill these essential principles.
Fig. 5 Details of privacy policy principles fulfillment per app. We differentiate principle fulfillment (blue),
from non-fulfillment (white), and absence of privacy policy text or very generic/outdated text (orange)
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Fig. 6 Total number of privacy policy principles covered by each app
4.2.3 Dangerous permission transparency in privacy policy document
Transparency is a basic data protection principle endorsed by privacy-by-design (Cavoukian
2010) and the GDPR. Importantly, it is one of the fundamental principles strictly endorsed
by the WHO (2020) to be followed by the developers of contact tracing apps. Therefore, it
is of particular importance to examine the extent to which contact tracing apps fulfill such
a requirement. We developed a set of relevant keywords (e.g. location, proximity, precise,
approximate, track, movement, gps, and so on) corresponding to each dangerous permission
(e.g. ACCESS FINE LOCATION) defined by Android7 to conduct a manual observation
for this task. As shown in Fig. 8, we found that only 14.2% (4 apps) of contact tracing apps
fully justify the need for requesting dangerous permission requests. Further, 28.5% (8 apps)
of them only partially clarify why they need to access certain dangerous permissions. This
indicates that more than half of the contact tracing apps (57.2%, 16 apps) failed to specify
the need for requesting dangerous permissions.
4.2.4 The GDPR impact
We also conducted a comparative analysis similar to the analysis that we carried out regard-
ing the permission requests of apps across the EU and rest of the world to compare the
7https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission, Accessed 03.09.2020
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Fig. 7 Privacy policy principles coverage
privacy policy principles fulfillment of contact tracing apps developed and published by
EU and non-EU bodies. Figure 9 shows the comparative analysis in terms of privacy policy
performance per category. Overall, similar to what we observed concerning the permission
manifest analysis, the EU apps are the most legal compliant ones. Except for privacy policy
changes, the EU apps perform better in all respects. For instance, when it comes to user’s
controls, only 42.1% of non-EU apps provide some specifications on how they allow users
to exercise their rights (the percentage is calculated by dividing the number of apps in a
certain group, e.g. non-EU apps, which fulfill a certain legal principle by the total number
of apps in that group). While this percentage is 88.8% for European apps. As for contact
information, only one-fifth of non-EU apps provided precise contact information in order
to enable users (data subjects) to contact them. However, this amount is almost 90% for EU
apps. The results clearly show that EU apps comply with the GDPR better than non-EU
apps.
Fig. 8 Details of dangerous permission usage transparency in privacy policy text of contact tracing apps. We
differentiate permission usage transparency (green), from permission usage non-transparency (red)
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Fig. 9 Privacy policy performance: EU vs. Non-EU contact tracing apps (the higher, the better)
4.3 Run-time permission access pattern analysis
Run-time analysis is another pillar of our multi-perspective analysis that provides us with
information regarding the permission access patterns of contact tracing apps at run-rime.
This is of particular importance as once a permission is granted to an app through the
Android permission manager system that was introduced in API 23 in Android 6.0 (Marsh-
mallow)8 to offer granular control to users, its risks are not fully mitigated (Fritsch and
Momen 2017; Hatamian et al. 2017; Momen et al. 2017) as granted privileges remain avail-
able to resource-hungry apps and advertising libraries that could lead to privacy implications
(Momen et al. 2019, 2020). This is why this section focuses on the question about how the
apps exercise their granted privileges to access permissions at run-time.
4.3.1 Test-bed for monitoring permission usage
Permission usage monitoring was conducted using our previously proposed tools (Hatamian
et al. 2018; Momen 2018) through logging, collecting, and analyzing permission access pat-
terns of contact tracing apps (e.g. access to sensitive resources like GPS). To analyze the
behavior of contact tracing apps listed in Table 1, we installed our monitoring tool together
with these 28 apps on laboratory devices. Next, while our monitoring tool was running in
the background the whole time (i.e., it was monitoring the permission access frequency of
apps), we started to open each and every contact tracing app once to trigger and activate
their desired functionality. To make sure that we did not miss any certain functionality, we
deliberately granted permissions whenever asked by the apps (either through the GUI or the
8https://developer.android.com/about/versions/marshmallow/android-6.0-changes.html Accessed 2020-06-11
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permission manager system of Android). Afterwards, we let the apps to execute in the back-
ground (without any further interactions, but were connected to WiFi network and a power
source). This was by intention as our goal was to figure out if apps access any sensitive
resources while there is no legitimate reason for that. After a one week ongoing experiment,
the data generated by the monitoring tool was collected and analyzed. Since the researchers
of this study were located in two EU countries (Sweden and Germany), the log collection
campaigns were carried out simultaneously in these two countries to investigate if con-
tact tracing apps behave differently when being used in different geographic locations. Our
objective was to find out what is being accessed by apps, at what time, and at which fre-
quency. For instance, Fig. 10 shows an example of collected logs, where eRouska accesses
a location-related permission at a certain time.
4.3.2 Results of permission access pattern analysis
Our motivation behind running parallel data collection campaigns in Germany and in Swe-
den about apps’ run-time behavior was to identify geographical influence and to achieve
clarity about app behavior. However, we observed similar, if not identical, permission
access patterns during run-time. Hence, Fig. 11 presents a cumulative result from both data
collection campaigns during a one week period. Majority of the apps (17 out of 28) are
found to be accessing three variations of LOCATION permission. Hence, they create risks to
location privacy that might lead to citizen tracking (Fritsch 2008b). Among them, 12 apps
are from non-EU countries and 5 apps are from EU countries. Non-EU apps seem to be exer-
cising location privileges more often. However, an EU app – SM-Covid19 (Italy) showed
the highest number of permission access within one week of data collection period (36.7K),
which cancels out the good behavior (fewer permission access counts) of other apps. Vari-
ants of STORAGE permission (cumulatively presented as READ EXTERNAL STORAGE)
were accessed by 9 non-EU apps and by 2 EU apps. Other than these, 2 non-EU apps
accessed CAMERA (Covi-ID) and RECORD AUDIO (Novid).
4.3.3 App behavior: Timeline inspection
In Figs. 12 and 13, we present a timeline of the most and the least frequent permis-
sion access patterns observed in the data set from Sweden (top five and bottom five,
respectively). Figure 12 presents the timeline of permission access patterns of the top five
permission-hungry apps: (i) Contact tracer, (ii) Stop Covid, (iii) SM-Covid19,
(iv) Private Kit, and (v) CoronApp. All of them are found to be accessing the
location-related permissions frequently such as ACCESS FINE LOCATION. Figure 13
shows a visual timeline of the privilege access patterns of the top five privacy-preserving
apps from our data set: (i) VirusRadar, (ii) Stopp Corona, (iii) Gerak Malaysia,
(iv) Novid and (v) Coalition. Their permission access patterns demonstrate sig-
nificantly fewer usage than the rest. However, Coalition showed permission access
event for LOCATION permission, whereas, Novid showed permission access event for
Fig. 10 An example of collected logs by the monitoring tool
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Fig. 11 Run-time permission access analysis results
RECORD AUDIO permission in the timeline (although this might be justifiable to a certain
extent due to the app being relied on ultrasonic technology, we wonder if these accesses are
legitimate due to the app not being used actively). It should be noted that our analysis suffers
from the limitation of false positive in the indication of good behavior. Though permission
access frequency is rather low for these five apps in Fig. 13, they could behave differently
during real-life usage (e.g. with user interaction). On the other hand, the app could have
over-privilege-issue, should it not require the corresponding permission. For example, good
behavior is documented for both VirusRadar and Gerak in Fig. 13, and at the same
time, Fig. 2 shows that they have the LOCATION permission listed in its manifest file. Sim-
ilarly, Novid and Coalition have the potential to behave in a privacy invasive manner
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Fig. 12 Timeline inspection of apps’ permission access pattern (dangerous permissions only): top five
privacy-invasive permission access patterns
(in terms of permission access pattern) during real life usage. Among the top five privacy-
preserving apps (according to their permission access pattern, as depicted in Fig. 13), only
Stopp Corona does not have any dangerous permission listed in its manifest file.
What needs to be highlighted here is the fact that many apps access location-related
permissions. We argue that this is extremely problematic from a privacy perspective due to
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Fig. 13 Timeline inspection of apps’ permission access pattern (dangerous permissions only): top five
privacy-preserving permission access patterns
four main reasons: (1) according to regulatory guideline documents (COVID-europe 2020;
EDPB-letter 2020) contact tracing apps should not request and access location data (as this
is not relevant to their proper functionality), (2) even though in some cases apps state (in
their privacy policies) that they request location data, we believe this is still problematic and
not aligned with best privacy and security practices, (3) as detailed in Fig. 8, many apps
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failed to state if they use a certain dangerous permission (including location-related ones)
and many of them started to access it in a non-transparent manner (Coronavirus-SUS,
Ito, Covid Safe, PrivateKit, etc.), and (4) we are aware that in Android, apps
must declare location permission in order to be able to access Bluetooth9. However, this
does not mean that apps that use Bluetooth can actively use location permission. Granting
location permission is meant to activate the general system setting Location Services. We
observed that some of these apps (e.g. Ito, Covid Safe, Coalition) claim to rely
on BLE technology, but our analysis shows that they have been accessing location-related
permissions.
4.4 Vulnerability analysis
One of the essential and critical aspects highlighted by the eHealth Network (COVID-
europe 2020) is the security of COVID-19 contact tracing apps. With the governments’ and
developers’ rushing to roll out contact tracing apps, concerns are emerging in relation to
the fact that there could be a broad range of security vulnerabilities lurking within these
apps, which could put an individual’s sensitive information at risk of being exploited. Fur-
ther, these apps access dangerous permissions (as highlighted in the previous sections),
which suggests that they indicate potential security risks. Therefore, it is highly important
that these COVID-19 apps are secured against malicious attacks as they access, store and
transmit sensitive data.
In order to lessen any potential harm that would emerge from exploiting a vulnerability,
an analysis is required in detecting potential security weaknesses that could be exploited and
leveraged by attackers within these apps. As such, we applied static analysis to the complete
app set shown in Table 1 using MobSF (Mobile security framework (mobsf) 2020). While
there are other tools capable of performing static code analysis, MobSF was selected based
on its popularity, scalability, easy adoption and its effectiveness in identifying vulnerabilities
within Android apps much quicker (Ibrar et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018). Vulnerability
assessment through static analysis relies on data contained in the app’s APK file, which
includes the manifest and the compiled code (Knorr et al. 2015). In this case, however, we
do not dwell on the permission analysis as it has been extensively discussed in the prior
sections.
We analyzed the results generated by the MobSF with the intention of identifying critical
vulnerabilities within the apps and comparing the security performance of apps published
by EU and non-EU bodies.
4.4.1 Detected vulnerabilities
Tables 3 and 4 provide an overview of the security issues identified from the analysis of
the APK files using MobSF. The framework uses Common Vulnerability Scoring System
Version 2.0 (CVSS V2), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and Open Web Applica-
tion Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 Mobile Risks to list and score some of the common
vulnerabilities within the app set as seen in Table 3, where the vulnerabilities identified
(listed as issues) have been selected and matched against these standards. While each
9https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/bluetooth, Accessed 03.09.2020




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   36 Page 34 of 51 Empir Software Eng           (2021) 26:36 
Table 4 An overview of the results from mobSF static analysis
Issue Percentage of apps
with the issues
The app logs information. Sensitive information should never be logged 100%
This app uses Java Hash Code. It is a weak hash function and should
never be used in Secure Crypto Implementation
100%
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive information like username,
password, keys etc.
89.3%
The App uses an insecure Random Number Generator 82.1%
App can write to App directory. Sensitive information should be
encrypted
28.6%
IP Address Disclosure 57.1%
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash collision 35.7%
The App uses SQLite Database and execute raw SQL query. Untrusted
user input in raw SQL queries can cause SQL injection. Also, sensitive
information should be encrypted and written to the database.
75%
App creates temp file. Sensitive information should never be written
into a temp file.
28.6%
App can read/write to external storage. Any app can read data written
to external storage
39.3%
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash collisions 39.3%
Insecure Webview Implementation. Execution of user controlled code
in WebView is a critical security hole
21.4%
The App uses ECB mode in cryptographic encryption algorithm. ECB
mode us known to be weak as it results in the same ciphertext for
identical blocks of plaintext
7.1%
Remote WebView debugging is enabled 7.1%
Insecure implementation of SSL. Trusting all the certificates or accept-
ing self signed certificates is a critical security hole. This app is
vulnerable to MITM attacks
3.6%
app has considerable amount of vulnerabilities as per the report generated by MobSF, we
picked vulnerabilities that had a score ranging from medium to high as highlighted under
the CVSS V2. CVSS V2 provides an open framework for communicating the characteris-
tics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities (Mell et al. 2007) while CWE10 provides a point of
reference for common vulnerabilities within software and hardware, and baseline for vul-
nerability identification. On the other hand, OWASP Top 10 provides a list of top ten mobile
risks which creates awareness about application and software security (Qian et al. 2018). In
addition to these, the framework provides the app’s average CVSS score and App Security
Score.
The outcome of the analysis revealed a number of vulnerabilities which could be consid-
ered as critical in this case. For example, 89.3% of the analyzed apps, apart from Stopp
Corona (Austria), Novid (US) and Mahakavach (India), contain potentially hard-coded
sensitive information like usernames, passwords, keys etc, which is considered to be of high
severity as mapped under the CVSS V2 (with a 7.4 score); however, while the vulnerability
does not match to a CWE indicated in Table 4, the use of hard-coded sensitive information
10https://cwe.mitre.org/index.html, Accessed 24.06.2020
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(CWE-798) is of high risk as it could allow an attacker to circumvent authentication set by
a software administrator.11 This information can be accessed through reverse engineering
the contact tracing apps’ source code. As a result, armed with this information, an attacker
is able to gain access to even more sensitive information, including the health status and
location data.
Further analysis of the results indicate that 75% of the apps use SQLite Database and
execute raw SQL query, apart from Contact Tracer, StopKorona!, COVIDSafe,
CoronApp, eRouska, VirusRadar, and StopCovid. Untrusted user input in raw
SQL queries can potentially lead to a local SQL Injection in the contact tracing app. In
addition to this, the apps tend to use an unencrypted SQLite Database. This leaves the sen-
sitive information lying open to attackers (Jain and Shanbhag 2012) with physical access
to the mobile device or a malicious app with root access to the device. Besides this, lack
of encryption could lead to privacy infringement and non-compliance to data protection
laws and regulation. Additionally, one app (Contact Tracer, Russia) uses an inse-
cure implementation of SSL which leads to insecure communication. As indicated, the app
could be vulnerable to MITM attacks, which undermines the information security goal of
confidentiality and integrity (Jain and Shanbhag 2012).
These vulnerabilities identified within the aforementioned COVID-19 contact tracing
apps result in not a robust security performance. While it was difficult to compare the
security analysis of COVID-19 contact tracing apps to other generic apps empirically, we
compared previous work that analysed the security of android apps using MobSF to deter-
mine whether the magnitude of the identified vulnerabilities could be similar to generic
apps. Comparing the vulnerabilities detected in work done by (Papageorgiou et al. 2018),
it can be noted that COVID-19 contact tracing apps have significant and a high number of
vulnerabilities. This can be supported by recent security analysis performed on COVID-19
contact tracing using MobSF by Sun et al. (Sun et al. 2020), which shows the same mag-
nitude of vulnerabilities we identified in our app set. Hence, it can be argued that while
other android apps, e.g., m-Health apps contain vulnerabilities, the quick development and
release of COVID-19 contact tracing apps without sufficient security analysis tends to result
in apps that have a poor security posture.
4.4.2 The GDPR impact
As mentioned, our app set contains a variety of COVID-19 contact tracing apps that come
from different countries across the globe. Therefore, we aim at interpreting and answering
the question of how these apps differ or are similar to each other in terms of their security
fulfillment across the EU and rest of the world.
Figure 14 shows a comparison graph of COVID-19 apps security score between EU and
non-EU apps. The app security – which is as a result of the MobSF measurement – is given a
score of 0-100, as manifested in the generated reports; where 0-15 indicates critical risk, 16-
40 indicates high risk, 41-70 indicates medium risk, and 71-100 indicates low risk. Overall,
it can be noted that majority of the apps have a very poor app security score. However, by
taking each area in isolation, several differences can be identified. The EU contact tracing
apps show major differences in app security score. While some apps show a medium app
security score, for example, eRouska (Czech Republic) with an app security score
of 60 and ito (Germany) with an app security score of 60, which is majorly attributed
11https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html, Accessed 29.09.2020
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Fig. 14 Apps’ security scores: EU vs. Non-EU contact tracing apps (the higher, the better)
to the fact that they have few vulnerabilities, with even less that have high severity score,
four of them show critical security scores. Interestingly, one of these apps with a critical app
security score (SM-Covid19, Italy) has also been highlighted as one of the five apps that
hungrily accesses dangerous permissions (see Section 4.3.2). These type of permissions go
for more sensitive information from the user. Hence, if the vulnerabilities within these apps
are exploited, an attacker would be able to access highly sensitive personal data - which
would range from location to health status among other personal data.
Despite the fact that these countries are GDPR enforced and some apps tend to access
less sensitive resource events, it can be interpreted that the reason for such an app security
score is due to the considerable number of vulnerabilities inherent in these apps. This of
course leads to several security issues. For example, the static analysis conducted on diAry
(Italy) shows that the app contains hard-coded sensitive information and the data stored
within the SQLite database is not encrypted; an attacker could gain access to hard-coded
credentials thus giving them further access to sensitive data, or they could potentially read
sensitive personal information from the unencrypted SQLite database.
When it comes to non-EU contact tracing apps, a majority of them manifest critical app
security score, with Private Kit (US) manifesting an app security score of 0. From
the report, it is indicated that the Private Kit contains vulnerabilities that have a high
severity, for example, the use of a weak hash (MD5), which is mapped in Table 4 under
CWE-327, could lead to a breach in confidentiality or privilege escalation when exploited
(Jain and Shanbhag 2012). Further, the app uses dangerous permissions for the purposes of
contact tracing, which put a user’s security at risk. While this is the case, there are some
non-EU apps that perform well in terms of security aspects. Of noteworthy is COVIDSafe
(Australia), which manifested a low risk app security score of 75. From the privacy analysis
conducted earlier, COVIDSafe shows that it only accesses one dangerous permission. On
the other hand, the security analysis shows that it has few vulnerabilities which can be
considered as trivial and low risk (apart from the existence of potential hardcoded sensitive
information). This indicates that several factors were considered, including the necessary
security measures needed for data protection (Cavoukian et al. 2009) prior to its roll out.
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5 Impact assessment
After conducting a multi-perspective analysis of existing COVID-19 contact tracing apps,
we carry out an assessment to quantify and assess privacy and security the impact of the
studied contact tracing apps. Such an assessment provides a basis for risk evaluation based
on our empirical data and multi-perspective analysis. We calculate the impact as an aggre-
gated score composed of the metrics explained in the previous sections of this article,
namely dangerous permission requests (Section 4.1), privacy policy analysis (Section 4.2),
dangerous permission usage (Section 4.3), and security vulnerabilities (Section 4.4). We
stress that our score is a privacy and security impact indicator, not an assessment of per-
sonal data subject impact normally provided with GDPR-demanded data protection impact
assessments nor an indicator of how dangerous/friendly an app might be for individuals’
privacy.
5.1 Impact assessmentmodel
We consider a set of a apps A = {v1, v2, . . . , va} consisting of four subsets d (D =
{w1, w2, . . . , wd}), e (E = {x1, x2, . . . , xe}), f (F = {y1, y2, . . . , yf }), and g (G =
{z1, z2, . . . , zg}), where wj (1 ≤ j ≤ d), xk (1 ≤ k ≤ e), yh (1 ≤ h ≤ f ), and
zm (1 ≤ m ≤ g) show the impact assessment criteria, namely dangerous permission
requests, absent clarification of privacy principles in policy texts, idle usage of dangerous
permissions, and vulnerability threats.
We also introduce a set of u users by U = {d1, d2, . . . , du}. Let F = {fv1 , fv2 , . . . , fvi }
be the set of features for each app vi . Accordingly, fvi consists of ordered quadruples
{(w1, x1, y1, z1), (w2, x2, y2, z2) . . . , (we, xf , yg, zh)}. We determine each feature as an
informative element regarding each app. As a result, the set of features related to all apps
is defined as {(Fv1), (Fv2), . . . , (Fva )}, where (Fv1) represents the feature Fv1 associated to
app v1.
We denote the Impact Value (IV ) regarding each individual feature Fvi concerning app





1 if Fvi = (wj , xk, yh, zm)
0 otherwise,
(1)
where if there is a hit in Fvi = (wj , xk, yh, zm), then IVvi ,Fvi = 1, otherwise IVvi ,Fvi = 0.
To achieve the Total Impact Score per app, our goal is to fuse the quadruple impact
assessment criteria (see Sections 4.1 to 4.4) as follows:
1. Dangerous Permission Request Score (wj ): The first impact criteria deals with the
impact of dangerous permission requests as discussed in Section 4.1. The Danger-
ous Permission Request Score has an upper limit of 8, since each app can request
a maximum number of dangerous permissions as many as 8 permissions detected in
our analysis. As it is evident, the higher the Dangerous Permission Request Score, the
severe the impact for privacy. For the sake of simplicity we have grouped all location-
and storage-related permission accesses into LOCATION and STORAGE categories.
Further, we have also normalized all the values between 1–100, being 100 means the
most severe case (requesting the maximum number of dangerous permissions, i.e. 8
permissions).
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2. Absent Specification in Privacy Policy Text Score (xk): The second impact criteria deals
with the impact of the absence of essential privacy principles in the privacy policy texts
of contact tracing apps as discussed in Section 4.2. The Absent Specification in Privacy
Policy Text Score has an upper limit of 12, since each app needs to cover 12 privacy
policy principles. As can be inferred, the higher the Absent Specification in Privacy
Policy Text Score, the severe the impact for privacy. For the sake of simplicity we have
also normalized all the values between 1–100, being 100 means the most severe case
(the absence of all privacy principles in privacy policy texts, i.e. the absence of 12
privacy policy principles).
3. Idle Dangerous Permission Usage Score (yh): The third impact criteria deals with the
impact of idle usage of dangerous permissions at run-time by contact tracing apps as
discussed in Section 4.3. Similar to the Dangerous Permission Request Score, the Idle
Dangerous Permission Usage Score has an upper limit of 8, since each app can access
a maximum number of dangerous permissions as many as 8 permissions detected in
our analysis (the higher the Idle Dangerous Permission Usage Score, the severe the
impact for privacy). For the sake of simplicity we have grouped all location- and
storage-related permission accesses into LOCATION and STORAGE categories. Fur-
ther, we have also normalized all the values between 1–100, being 100 means the most
severe case (accessing the maximum number of dangerous permissions while being
idle/running in the background without any user interaction, i.e. 8 permissions).
4. App’s Security Score (zm): The fourth (last) impact criteria deals with the impact of
detected security vulnerabilities of contact tracing apps as discussed in Section 4.4. The
tool used for our analysis generates security scores per app within our data set ranging
from 1 to 100, being 100 means the best security performance, however, to make such
a score unified and compatible to other scores, we use the inverse percentage, e.g. an
app that has a security score of 80 – the more closer to 100 means better security
performance – will be inverted to 20 means that the more closer to 0 means better
security performance. Therefore, while calculating the Total Impact Score, we use the
inverted value of App’s Security Score, meaning that an app security score of 100 means
the most severe case.
We propose the following Total Impact Score as the averaged value of all individual




IVvi ,Fvi /4. (2)
It is worth mentioning that, we presume all the quadruple impact assessment criteria to
be equally risky for privacy and security. In addition, we treat the different data sets as con-
tributing equally to the Total Impact Score when fusing the results. The reason for giving
equal weights to these four criteria is threefold: (1) privacy-by-design (Cavoukian 2010) as a
global standard framework demands both strong security and strong privacy that avoids the
pretense of dichotomies such as privacy versus security. Hence, our work remains within the
intersection of security and privacy aiming at investigating privacy and security quality indi-
cators inspired by legal requirements. That is why our impact assessment scheme is based
on the assumption that apps should offer both strong privacy and strong security, and there-
fore, all these four privacy and security criteria are equal, (2) these contact tracing apps have
very clear functionality (breaking the chain of the virus) and for this functionality they must
function with the minimum number of dangerous permission requests as their goal should
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be neither monetizing nor tracking and profiling (as opposed to other apps like social net-
working ones), and (3) there is a global consensus on how these apps should function under
strict data protection goals (as discussed in Section 2.2). As such, we believe prioritizing
one or some of these four criteria (which one is is less or more important) will go against
the global demand for making these apps function under strict data protection requirements.
We would like to mention that the main objective of such an impact assessment scheme is
to classify apps according to their privacy and security impact and quantify the impact that
each of them might have on individuals’ privacy and security. In fact, the objective of such
an impact assessment scheme is not to rank/score apps based on their privacy and security
intrusiveness level and to say which one is more privacy-intrusive or more privacy-friendly.
Rather, the goal is to see how each app performs when it comes to the impact that has for
individuals’ privacy. This is an important point as all these apps are homogeneous in terms
of functionality (contact tracing apps) and expected (by law) to function without the need
to access sensitive data (e.g. GPS data). As a result, the goal of such an aggregated impact
assessment score (combination of four privacy and security criteria) was to see which of
these apps show hungriness in requesting and accessing sensitive data (while they are not
supposed to be data greedy by law), which ones are more transparent and open to users
(while they are required by law to be fully transparent to users), and which ones are more
advanced in terms of following security requirements within the app’s code (while they are
required to fulfill essential security requirements within the app’s codes).
Based on our analysis, the impact of an app on users’ privacy can be deemed as more
severe if it requests higher number of dangerous permissions, has less coverage of essential
privacy principle in its privacy policy document, has higher number of dangerous permis-
sions accesses at run-time, and has higher security vulnerabilities. Algorithm 1 details all
the aforementioned steps corresponding to the measurement of both individual and total
impact scores.
5.2 Impact assessment results
We measured and assessed the scores related to the impact assessment criteria as shown
in Fig. 15. We show dangerous permission requests score with green, absent specification
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Fig. 15 Individual quadruple impact scores (scores are normalized between 0–100): (1) dangerous permis-
sion requests score (green), (2) absent specification in privacy policy text score (red), (3) idle dangerous
permission usage score (orange), (4) app security score (blue), and (5) the Total Impact Score (black). The
more closer the scores to 100, the more severe the impact on individuals’ privacy
in privacy policy text with red, idle dangerous permission usage score with orange, app
security score with blue, and the Total Impact Score with a thick black line. The more closer
the scores to 100, the more severe the the impact on individual’ privacy. As can be seen,
the highest scores belong to Absent Specification in Privacy Policy Text Score and App’s
Security Score. This means that these apps have serious issues when it comes to having
clear, concise, and regulation-friendly privacy policy texts. Similarly, most apps suffer from
critical security issues (as detailed in Section 4.4) that resulted in very high scores (5 apps
were scored as maximum, i.e. 100). Although there have been suspicious and abnormal
run-time dangerous permission accesses, our results show that apps perform better when it
comes to their Idle Dangerous Permission Usage Score (the highest and lowest scores are
37,5 and 0, respectively).
As the results from four different sources are aggregated into a Total Impact Score as
depicted in Fig. 16, an overall comparison can be drawn from it by ordering from lowest to
highest impact score. The bar charts are presented for each app. They also differentiate the
EU apps from the non-EU ones. An app has the possibility to accumulate a Total Impact
Score of 100. For instance, the results indicate that Covid Safe (US) has the highest
Total Impact Score among others (66,2), meaning that it has more severe impact on users’
privacy. The detailed assessment reveals that this app got scores 37,5, 100, 37,5, and 100
(each of them out of 100) for its wj (Dangerous Permission Request Score), xk (Absent
Specification in Privacy Policy Text Score), yh (Idle Dangerous Permission Usage Score),
and zm (App’s Security Score), respectively. In terms of apps with less severe impact on
users’ privacy, COVIDSafe (Austrlia) has dominated others with a score as much as 22,9
(out of 100). Similar to the observations that we previously had with respect to the better
privacy and security behavior of the contact tracing apps published by the EU institutes
(where the GDPR is applied and enforced), the results of impact analysis also confirm that 6
(60%) EU apps (shown by blue in Fig. 16) are among the top 10 apps with minimum impact
of users’ privacy (only one EU app belongs to the top 10 apps with the most severe impact).
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Fig. 16 Total Impact Scores per contact tracing app (averaged value of individual impact scores which is
normalized between 0–100). Ordered from low to high – the more closer the scores to 100, the more severe
the impact on individuals’ privacy
6 Discussion
Our multi-perspective privacy and security analysis of COVID-19 contact tracing apps sheds
light on a diverse number of data protection issues regarding the existing contact tracing
apps. Firstly, we observed that COVID-19 contact tracing apps request a mixed variety of
permissions, including dangerous and signature ones. A simple contact tracing app needs
to only access a limited number of permissions. For instance, some of the existing frame-
works are fully based on BLE technology12, and thus, requesting other permissions such
as location, microphone, users’ contact details, etc. become unnecessary and irrelevant to
deliver the intended functionality – tracing the spread of virus. Surprisingly, we found a
great number of apps within our data set that claim they do not require any sensitive permis-
sion to function (such as location), but when it comes to their run-time permission accesses,
we observed they are actively accessing such permissions. Secondly, the privacy policy
text analysis of contact tracing apps showed that these apps tend to be non-transparent
regarding their data collection, processing, sharing and transfer practices. This raises seri-
ous concerns with respect to their compliance with existing privacy laws such as the GDPR
(within the EU) and the corresponding data protection regulation of that country. Thirdly,
the run-time analysis of the permission access pattern of these apps revealed that contact
tracing apps are massively over-privileged and tend to be data-hungry even though the user
was not actively using them. At the first glance, the problem of over-privileged apps is
a design issue which is completely independent of national or international data protec-
tion legislation. In fact, an app that asks for as many permissions as possible (regardless
12https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-android, Accessed 20.06.2020
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of whether those permission requests are aligned with its proper functionality) is deviat-
ing from basic design principles such as Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) (Saltzer and
Schroeder 1975) that works by allowing only enough access to perform the required job
which is also about monitoring and managing access for those who need access such as app
developers. Apart from this, the problem of over-privileged apps is directly connected to
fundamental legal principles such as data minimization (minimize access to personal data)
and purpose limitation (limit access to personal data only for specified purposes) which are
widely mandated and enforced by different data protection legislation such as the GDPR,
the UK Data Protection Act 2018 (2018), Australia Privacy Act (2020), and Canada Per-
sonal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (2019). We also believe such
a behavior (an app being over-privileged) is an obvious deviation from privacy-by-design
(Cavoukian 2010) which is a basic design concept that asks software developers to inte-
grate privacy-respecting measures into the design cycle of their software. Lastly, our study
revealed that although there are some apps that behave in a privacy-respecting manner,
they suffer from security issues. This is a clear deviation from the full functionality prin-
ciple of privacy-by-design (Cavoukian 2010), that seeks to provide the maximum level of
functionality while satisfying all the legitimate objectives in a “win-win” manner by avoid-
ing a false trade-off between privacy and security, indicating the possibility of having both
strong privacy and strong security.
Considering the critical situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the privacy
and security risks revealed by our analysis regarding the available contact tracing apps, we
would like to highlight that privacy and security considerations should be integrated into
the design of contact tracing apps without undermining users’ privacy. Thus, in what fol-
lows, we provide several calls for actions regarding existing privacy and security principles
enforced by widely adopted data privacy laws such as the GDPR. However, what needs to
be highlighted here is that since this study has been conducted in the EU, our work was
inspired by the GDPR and other EU regulatory documents. Although there are overlaps
between data protection requirements mandated by the GDPR and some other data protec-
tion acts enforced in non-EU countries (a particular example of these overlaps is children
protection which is widely recognized and enforced under different data protection regimes
such as US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (1998), Brazilian Data Protection
Law (2018), South Korea Personal Information Protection Act (2020), India’s Personal Data
Protection Bill (2018), and many more), we would like to highlight that the discussion points
discussed within this section may not be necessarily generalizable to all the studied apps
(mainly non-EU apps).
Purpose limitation and data minimization Our study revealed that COVID-19 contact
tracing apps are actively accessing data (including sensitive ones) and sometimes contacting
third parties ranging from advertising to analytic networks. For instance, using the tool in
(Razaghpanah et al. 2015), we found that Crashlytics (crash reporting and analytics),
OneSignal (push notifications), and Facebook Graph (ads and analytics) are the most
contacted third-parties by the contact tracing apps (17 apps). Contacting a third-party library
by itself is not an obvious sign of a privacy breach, however, our results confirm the high
presence of third-party components in contact tracing apps and some of them are associated
with third-party advertisement and tracking services (which may to a certain extent justify
why many of these apps request and access location-related permissions). We argue that this
is not aligned with current EU and non-EU privacy guidelines for designing contact trac-
ing apps. Furthermore, the GDPR states that personal data shall be “collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible
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with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scien-
tific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Art. 89
(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes”, Art. 5 (1b). When data
is collected from users in app ecosystems, such data has to be considered as personal data as
in the meaning of the GDPR. The relevant data to the smartphone itself, such as the device’s
identifier is also categorized as personal data (ENISA 2017). Therefore, to fully comply with
the GDPR Art. 6 (4) (“data processing for incompatible purposes should be avoided unless
it is on the basis of a specific set of criteria in the GDPR”), app providers must only process
data when the contact tracing app has a specific lawful purpose for doing so. Further-
more, our study shows that there have been many cases where the apps accessed sensitive
resources while there was no legitimate reason for that. For instance, those cases that apps
are not claiming the need for requesting location data in their privacy policies, while they
request and access such permissions in reality is quite problematic, or where they claim they
are fully functioning based on BLE technology, but they access location-related permissions
(e.g. Coalition). Similarly, even though some of the apps already stated in their privacy
policies that they request location permissions (obviously because they are based on GPS
technology), we still believe that this is against best data protection practices as our analysis
of legal guidelines (see Section 2.2) confirms that active access to location-related permis-
sions is an obvious violation of several data protection principles, including but not limited
to data minimization and purpose limitation. More importantly, such an extreme tendency
in requesting location-related permissions can result in apps being over-privileged (asking
for as much data as they can, even those that are irrelevant to their functionality) and invade
individuals’ privacy, such as the claim by a Minnesota law enforcement official confirm-
ing that the state was employing contact tracing to identify connections among protesters
who were detained during the “Black Lives Matter demonstrations” (2020). Moreover, we
observed some of the contact tracing apps request and access signature-level permissions.
It should be noted that since signature-level permissions usually give more control to an
app through managing system-level functionalities, the developers of contact tracing apps
should not request such permission requests unless they are aligned with purposes. We
also observed that some of the contact tracing apps do not provide any privacy-by-default
options to users to limit/isolate data sharing practices. Hence, data sharing must be isolated
by default unless explicitly specified or otherwise chosen by the user.
Third-country sharing When sharing data with third-parties, the legal standards of the
country where the third-party resides plays an important role. Considering Art. 13 (1f), 14
(1f) of the GDPR, data transfer to other countries is only lawful, where a similar level of
protection as provided by the GDPR is guaranteed. Whether this is the case needs to be
assessed by the European Commission and can be done on the basis of a country, terri-
tory, specified sector, or international organization. Besides these restrictions on where to
share personal data, Art. 13 (1f), 14 (1f) require data controllers to adopt appropriate safe-
guards and means followed by contractual arrangements with the recipient of the personal
data approved by the European Commission. In our analysis, we found a number of data
transmissions to different countries by contact tracing apps that have not been justified in
privacy policy documents. The providers of contact tracing apps need to be fully aware that
whenever third-party servers (outside the EU) are used as a back-end, the corresponding
regulations applied to third-country data sharing practices are enforced.
Data retention Our experiments showed that a significant number of contact tracing apps
within our data set (71.4%, 20 apps), are not transparent regarding their data retention
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period. App providers/developers are required to be clear about the retention period and they
should limit it only to the amount of time needed to provide the desired service. Thus, any
personal data should be instantly deleted (including stored data on the remote servers) after
the expiration of the retention period. Additionally, any confidential data, including location
patterns, health-related data, etc. must be successfully deleted upon app deinstallation from
the device and any other storage medium.
Transparency Transparency is one of the key principles of the GDPR. Smartphone app
providers/developers are required to be clear and explicit about their data access, collection,
process, and transfer practices. Also, they are responsible for determining the internal rules
once data collection purposes change. This also entails the direct communication of such
changes to users before they come into effect. Furthermore, any incident regarding users’
personal data shall be promptly communicated to users, e.g., in case personal data breach
happens, users and the respective Data Protection Authority must be immediately informed
(this also includes the potential occurred risks and possible countermeasures). However, our
results confirmed that none of the examined contact tracing apps is transparent about how
they react to a data breach, and how they handle such incidents in case users’ personal data
falls into the wrong hands. To further improve transparency, a clear, comprehensive, under-
standable, and legitimate privacy policy text should be accessible to users. We observed
some of these apps either do not have any privacy policy document (e.g. Coronavı́rus -
SUS, Brazil) or have very generic texts that do not focus on the app’s data handling practices
(e.g. Private Kit, US).
Integrity and confidentiality Art. 5 (1f) of the GDPR states that, “personal data shall be
processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security, including protection against unau-
thorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using
appropriate technical or organizational measures (integrity and confidentiality)”. Develop-
ers must make sure that the app’s integrity is preserved intact by checking resources for
potential modifications. One way is to restrict writing and modification permissions. How-
ever, we found that almost 40% of contact tracing apps tend to not restrict writing and
modification capabilities. We observed that nearly 40% percent of the studied contact trac-
ing apps use weak hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1. This is highly critical as it
may cause reverse engineering attacks. Additionally, we noticed that 75% of contact tracing
apps tend to store raw data on the device’s storage without applying any encryption mecha-
nisms. Enforced by the GDPR Art. 5 (1e), the implementation of appropriate technical and
organizational measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of users is highly important.
Hence, app developers have to adopt and apply up-to-date protection and encryption mech-
anisms for data storing purposes. This is mainly because an insecure storage is not only a
risk factor when the device is stolen, but also when another app accesses unencrypted raw
data (?VASCO). Therefore, storing any sensitive data such as users’ credentials, location
information, etc. on the device’s storage in an unencrypted form must be avoided.
Accountability Accountability demands service/app providers to demonstrate how they
comply with data protection regulations. This includes careful documentation of all
decision-making procedures with respect to the ongoing data processing and conducting
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) to tackle data protection issues. When per-
sonal data is being processed, app developers are required to carefully document all decision
making procedures with respect to the ongoing data processing such as maintaining cer-
tain documentation on what personal data is processed (how, for how long and for what
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purpose). A security report handling point (address) must be implemented and maintained
aiming at enabling users to contact app developers/providers conveniently. However, our
experimental results revealed that 57% of the studied contact tracing apps do not provide
any contact information. In addition, all the required procedures must be anticipated and
established in case a data breach happens (including a communication channel to react to
reports on security and privacy issues). Following best privacy and security practices, all
privacy- and security-relevant policies, processes, operations and testing procedures should
be documented. This also includes the documentation of risk assessment and management
procedures, compliance with regulations and requirements (e.g., the GDPR), a record of
users’ consent, objections, contracts with external service providers and third-parties from
which the data is collected or transferred to.
We believe the methodology used in this paper can not only provide a quick compari-
son of COVID-19 contact tracing Android apps’ privacy and security behavior, but also a
preliminary assessment of apps’ privacy and security performance in general. This is due to
the fact that, the static and dynamic app behavior analysis done in this paper is independent
of the nature of the apps. Additionally, the compatibility with privacy regulation is not only
meant for COVID-19 contact tracing apps. As such, the data protection principles discussed
and covered in this paper are also obligatory for other apps with different functionalities and
in different contexts. This also holds for the identified compliance issues.
7 Conclusion
Our investigation shows that many of the early contact tracing apps were engineered quickly.
They do not take privacy regulation fully into consideration. Their documentations and
policies seem incomplete and incohesive. Program code seems poorly quality-assured. We
performed various forms of analysis of COVID-19 contact tracing apps based on a group of
assessment metrics. Our main findings are:
– Privacy policies provided for many of the apps were found incomplete or non-existent
at the time of our study.
– Many apps showed a privacy-invasive permission access behavior, especially concern-
ing location-related permissions.
– Several apps began accessing location permissions even before personalizing and
registering them.
– From a regulatory perspective, the EU apps showed in general less privacy risk indi-
cators than the non-EU apps. But still, most apps fail to comply with one or more of
GDPR’s privacy principles
– Code vulnerability analysis showed several vulnerabilities in apps’ codes.
The above findings indicate, in our opinion, a very immature state of the infection tracing
apps. Incomplete documentation such as privacy policies as well as a large number of vul-
nerabilities detected by code analysis are strong indicators of quick development. Though
speculative, we think this may be the result of a very quick decision-making and of insuf-
ficient time for quality assurance. This might also explain that none of the apps covers the
complete regulatory requirements set forth by the GDPR - not even the EU apps. Purpose-
binding and transparency issues as well as incomplete information for data subject consent
have widely been detected in the sample.
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Limitations Several limitations arise when identifying security and privacy aspects of con-
tract tracing apps. Firstly, our research is limited to the Android platform only. Therefore,
it is difficult to speculate about iOS apps. However, we believe the results obtained from
privacy policy analysis (see Section 4.2) could be easily generalized to iOS ecosystem as
app providers normally publish the same privacy policies for both Android and iOS apps.
In terms of resource access pattern analysis, one could think of device instrumentation to
jailbreak an iOS device to enable a run-time analysis, but this could then face the incom-
pleteness of analyzed data set (6 out of 28 apps in our data set were not available for iOS).
Hence, we abstain from speculating about apps from other platforms. Secondly, we cannot
claim that the presented results are reproducible with respect to variable contexts. This is an
unavoidable limitation due to the ever-evolving nature of the apps, as well as of the Android
platform itself. Apps get regularly updated along with their privacy policies, leaving static
data snapshots outdated. Thus, it is a very difficult property to achieve because of the chal-
lenges associated with retrieving the older versions of apps, privacy policies, and various
forks of the Android operating system to create a similar test bed, as well as identical data
collection campaign. However, we have archived the corresponding data that was used to
produce results and thus, the analysis could be run again. We also confirm that one should
distinguish those apps that were considered to be mature at the time they were deployed
and used, and others that were preliminary and not officially endorsed by public authorities,
e.g. Ito (Germany). Thirdly, the result from permission analysis suffers from controlled
environment that was controlled by avoiding interaction with the device, and therefore, the
results of permission access patterns analysis may not be necessarily generalized to other
app’s states (e.g. an app being actively used). Lastly, although the results obtained from the
vulnerability analysis tool shows a considerable number of security issues, this cannot be
fully confirmed as the results may suffer from false-positives. This is due to the fact that,
the tool applies regular expression search which might not be accurate enough to figure out
more specific and correct security issues.
Furthermore, we encountered several obstacles while preparing the test bed for the apps:
(a) the official version of the app was restricted to geographic installation only, (b) apps
were found incompatible to run on our rooted test devices, (c)we were compelled to exclude
older test devices due to higher requirements (in terms of device and operating system) from
the apps, (d) apps were found demanding registration with citizen data before running, and
(e) apps’ documentation was found incomplete, or in languages that are not automatically
translatable using regular tools. So, we had to find work-around (e.g. acquiring .apk files
from unofficial sources (Apkmirror 2020; Apkpure.com 2020) in order to prepare the test
environment. Consequentially, the documented app behavior is expected to deviate from the
privacy friendliness/intrusiveness of apps in a real-life device usage scenario. As another
limitation of our work, since our study was conducted within the EU, our investigations
mostly relied on compliance issues with regard to the GDPR requirements. This means
although the results obtained from the legal compliance analysis can be easily generalized
to all apps published within the EU, they may not be necessarily generalized to all non-EU
countries as those countries may have less strict data protection requirements as offered by
the GDPR, and therefore, they may not need to fully comply with all the studied require-
ments in this paper. In addition, our aggregated impact assessment scheme processes all
metrics equally. We believe under certain circumstances some of these metrics may not be
fully representative in certain countries where neither the GDPR nor other well-established
privacy and security legal requirements are enforced under strict data protection regimes.
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Outlook A new generation of contact tracing apps is under launch. They are related to a
shared code base that focuses on Bluetooth contact tracing with de-centralized local stor-
age on the devices. Cryptography is used to generate pseudonyms, while data subjects are
engineered to be in control over data release for tracing in many of the solutions. The
apps are launched at the time of the completion of this article. We hope they will be more
matured not only in their privacy architecture, but in addition in their documentation and
their code quality once we inspect them. We wish their issuing authorities the best with their
experimentation with digital contact tracing, which still is an unproven technology.
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